The “Philadelphi Flip” Plan
Breaking the Impasse in Gaza Ceasefire Negotiations
Proposed is a tactical diplomatic (and surreptitious) approach to break the current impasse in Gaza ceasefire negotiations. It will require the tight coordination between Egypt, the United States, and Israel in a drastic move to free the hostages. Yes, it’s drastic.
The Issue:
Israel’s Rafah invasion has revealed the degree to which the Philadelphi corridor serves as a ‘lifeline’ for Hamas – providing a constant stream of weaponry for rearmament, as well as an insurance policy for key leadership to smuggle themselves and/or hostages out of Gaza when needed. It is for this reason that the Israeli government now refuses to cede Philadelphi to Hamas in any ceasefire negotiation. Without Philadelphi, Hamas sees insufficient benefit from a deal to surrender its high-value hostages.
The Solution:
Step 0: A secret agreement between Egypt, Israel, and the US (details below). Hamas is NOT aware of this agreement.
Step 1: Israel Cedes Philadephi to Hamas. Israel yields full control of Philadelphi to Hamas in exchange for immediately freeing a large cohort of hostages.
Step 2: “The Philadelphi Flip”
In a temporary swap, Egypt grants Israel temporary security control of the 1km buffer zone on the Egyptian side of Rafah. That’s a 1km deep buffer along a 14km border. This way, Israel can adhere to the Hamas hostage deal while reliably preventing arms smuggling to Hamas and the stealing away of hostages.
In exchange, Israel grants Egypt temporary security control of either:
- (Ideal option) A 1km deep buffer zone, 28km long along the Egypt/Israel border in the Negev. In this scenario, Egypt is the ‘net winner’ in terms of amount of land and the swap is minimally disruptive.
- A 1 km deep buffer zone, 14km long, along the Israeli/Egyptian border at Tabah/Eilat. This would essentially mean shifting the Eilat/Tabah border by 1km temporarily. Egypt now gets ‘equivalent’ coastal land in the swap (on the Red Sea as opposed to the Mediterranean). This would certainly extend wait times at the Taba border crossing while the swap happens, and would mean the temporary closure of two beaches near the temporary crossing.
There is precedent for this type of temporary land swap between Israel and the Arab countries. In the 1994 peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, two specific areas, known as Naharayim/Baqura and Tzofar/Al-Ghamr, were subject to special arrangements that effectively functioned as temporary land swaps.
Step 3: The Bribe
Israel’s Rafah invasion has similarly revealed the embarrassing reliance of individuals in the Egyptian armed forces on kickbacks from Gaza smuggling – with broader domestic political implications inside Egypt. After 8+ months of fighting in Gaza, it was the capture of Philadelphi by Israel that triggered Egypt joining the IJC case against Israel. Why? Their take of Qatari/Iran-to-Hamas smuggling cashflow dried up.
In order to get Egypt on-board, we’ll have to compensate for this cash flow. Fortunately, it actually isn’t very much (to the Egyptians, at least). For our purposes we’ll estimate approximately 4,000 Egyptian troops stationed in the relevant areas.
Here are the average annual salaries of soldiers in the Egyptian military:
- Junior Officers (Lieutenants, Captains): $3,000 to $6,000 annually
- Mid-Level Officers (Majors, Colonels): $6,000 to $15,000 annually
- Senior Officers (Generals): $15,000 to $30,000 annually
ChatGPT and I did some analysis of smuggling revenue. It’s estimated that smuggling kickbacks bring in approximately $30M a year to these troops. To get our hostages back (and untether the Israeli economy)? $30M is totally worth it. Let’s double it – just in case. $60M is less than 5% of annual U.S. military aid to Egypt. I’m sure the US would gladly add this to the annual bill.
Ensuring that the funds reach the right people in the right amounts without causing unrest within the Egyptian military is a significant challenge, given the existing jealousy, cronyism, and competition for access to lucrative smuggling activities. We would need to leverage precedents for structured payments within the Egyptian military. These are often used to reward loyalty, incentivize performance, and ensure the stability of the military hierarchy. Here are some examples:
1. Special Allowances (بدلات خاصة) Badalāt Khāṣṣa:
- Description: Special allowances are additional payments provided to military personnel, often based on the difficulty or risk associated with their assignments. These could include allowances for serving in remote or hazardous areas, which would apply to those stationed in the Sinai.
- Precedent: The Egyptian military has historically used special allowances to reward officers and soldiers in challenging or strategically important regions. These payments are often justified as compensation for the increased risks or hardships faced by these personnel.
2. Hardship Pay (بدل المخاطر) Badal al-Makhāṭir:
- Description: Hardship pay is provided to military personnel stationed in particularly difficult or dangerous conditions, such as those in conflict zones or areas with harsh environmental conditions.
- Precedent: Officers and soldiers stationed in the Sinai, particularly in areas close to the Gaza border, may already be receiving some form of hardship pay due to the ongoing security challenges in the region. This existing structure could be expanded or enhanced to provide additional compensation.
3. Loyalty Bonuses (مكافآت الولاء) Mukāfāt al-Walāʾ:
- Description: Loyalty bonuses are payments made to ensure the continued loyalty of key military personnel. These can be periodic bonuses tied to service anniversaries, promotions, or successful completion of important missions.
- Precedent: The Egyptian military, like many others, has used loyalty bonuses to reward and retain senior officers and other key personnel. These bonuses are often distributed quietly to avoid unrest or jealousy among lower ranks.
4. Operational Bonuses (مكافآت العمليات)- Mukāfāt al-ʿAmaliyyāt:
- Description: These bonuses are tied to specific operations or missions, rewarding officers and soldiers for their participation and success in these activities. This could be framed as compensation for effective border control or counter-smuggling operations.
- Precedent: The Egyptian military has used operational bonuses to incentivize participation in critical missions. This could include counterterrorism operations in the Sinai, where officers and soldiers receive additional compensation for their efforts.
6. Discretionary Payments (المدفوعات التقديرية) Al-Madfūʿāt al-Taqdīriyya:
- Description: Discretionary payments are often made at the behest of senior officers or the government, directed to specific individuals or groups within the military. These payments are typically off-the-books and are used to address specific needs or to placate key figures.
- Precedent: Discretionary payments are a common tool in managing the complex relationships within the Egyptian military, particularly when dealing with internal politics or ensuring the loyalty of certain factions.
In Summary:
It’s drastic – and painful. Israel would temporarily changing its borders to get its hostages back, while preventing hamas from rearming or stealing away hostages.
Could the current Egyptian regime’s disdain for the Muslim brotherhood sufficient to allow this to happen?
…Could it work?